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Abstract—For security, environmental, and regulatory pur-
poses it is useful to continuously monitor wide areas for unex-
pected changes in radioactivity. We report on a temporal anomaly
detection algorithm which uses mobile detectors to build a spatial
map of background spectra, allowing sensitive detection of any
anomalies through many days or months of monitoring. We adapt
previously-developed anomaly detection methods, which compare
spectral shape rather than count rate, to function with limited
background data, allowing sensitive detection of small changes
in spectral shape from day to day. To demonstrate this technique
we collected daily observations over the period of six weeks on a
0.33 square mile research campus and performed source injection
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONDUCTING wide-area radiation surveillance is a chal-lenging problem for environmental and security applica-
tions. For example, a city may wish to produce a map of
radiation sources over a wide region, identify unexpected or
unauthorized radioactive sources and take corrective action,
then monitor the area for any future introduction of sources.
Dedicated systems have been developed, such as the United
States Department of Energy’s Aerial Measuring System,
which uses aircraft to map radiological activity at nuclear sites
and during emergencies [1], [2]; however, these systems focus
on one-time mapping, rather than continuous monitoring and
surveillance.
For city-sized areas, current mapping efforts typically
use low-flying helicopters. These operations produce high-
resolution maps, but require several weeks of intensive flying,
making them unsuitable for continuous monitoring. Other
methods of mapping include gamma-ray imaging devices
mounted in vehicles [3]; mobile scintillator detectors which
search for sudden changes in background spectral shape,
indicating the detector is traveling past a source [4], [5]; and
commercially-available portable identifying spectrometers.
Manuscript received April 3, 2013; revised August 21, 2013; accepted April
9, 2014. This research has been funded in part by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters.
A. Reinhart is with the Department of Statistics, Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity, Pittsburgh PA 15213 (e-mail areinhar@stat.cmu.edu).
A. Athey is with Applied Research Laboratories, The University of Texas
at Austin, Austin TX 78713 (e-mail alex.athey@arlut.utexas.edu).
S. Biegalski is with the Nuclear Engineering Teaching Laboratory, The
University of Texas at Austin, TX 78712.
Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, DOI
10.1109/TNS.2014.2317593. c© 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is
permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any
current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for
advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale
or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of
this work in other works.
These methods are limited in a number of ways. An aerial
survey which requires weeks to complete cannot continuously
monitor a wide area in real time. For vehicle-based mobile
detectors, previous work has developed spectroscopic source
detection algorithms, but these do not perform change detec-
tion from one survey to the next, and do not take advantage
of previous background observations to improve detection
sensitivity [5]. Imaging methods require large and expen-
sive detectors and focus on detecting and imaging individual
sources, rather than mapping large areas.
We report on an integrated system of (a) mobile data
collection, (b) spatial-temporal database of gamma spectra,
and (c) spatially-aware anomaly mapping algorithm. Collec-
tively we refer to this system as the spectral comparison ratio
anomaly mapping (SCRAM) system. The SCRAM system
uses mobile detectors to build spectral maps of wide areas
and identifies temporal anomalies using spectral comparison
ratios (SCRs), detecting changes in spectral shape. By using
a spatial database of observed spectra and comparing new
observations to the recorded background, a high sensitivity to
temporal anomalies is obtained. To demonstrate these concepts
we collect and analyze a sample dataset on a small research
campus.
This research is motivated as a feasibility study to consider
collecting radiation maps with vehicles that naturally transit
areas of interest through their daily operations, such as patrol
vehicles, buses, or unmanned aerial vehicles. Such a system,
collecting data continuously as vehicles operate, would pro-
vide high-sensitivity, continuous, wide-area surveillance at low
operational cost.
II. SCRAM SYSTEM
The SCRAM system is composed of three core components:
a mobile detection platform, based on a scintillator detector
and GPS system; a spatial and temporal database of observed
spectra allowing analysis and change detection; and an analysis
method based on spectral comparison ratios. We constructed
a proof-of-concept platform using off-the-shelf components.
A. Mobile Detection Platform
The first component in the SCRAM system is a platform
for collecting radiation data. For data collection, the required
electronics were USB-based GPS, USB-based scintillator de-
tector and a PC laptop; the largest of these components was the
laptop and all items were easily contained in a small backpack.
This could be carried by a person or placed in a golf cart or
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
11
35
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.da
ta-
an
]  
6 M
ay
 20
14
2other vehicle. The detector was a Bridgeport Instruments 2×2-
inch cesium iodide scintillator and was used to collect spectra
continuously at two-second intervals; however, the analysis
system is agnostic to choice of sensor, and would work with
other gamma spectra detectors, including much larger or more
sensitive devices.
B. Spatial-Spectral-Temporal Database
The second component in the SCRAM system is a method
of storing multiple-pass radiation data in a spatial and temporal
database. For this, we constructed a database of spectra using
the PostGIS geographic information system [6], [7]. Software
was developed to allow for rapid spatial and temporal querying
of spectra. Spectra were recorded into the database along
with the detector’s GPS coordinates, current time, and several
diagnostic fields.
We were able to use our spatial and temporal database to
determine the expected background at each location, along
with the background variability with respect to time. More
importantly, new observations could be compared against the
background at a location by querying the database for past
observations, which were summed together to produce an
accurate background spectrum determination.
C. Spectral Comparison Ratio Anomaly Mapping
The final component of the SCRAM system is a spectral
anomaly detection algorithm. Our algorithmic approach is
based on the method of spectral comparison ratios (SCRs), as
previously developed by other authors [4], [8], with modifica-
tion to accurately produce a covariance estimate with limited
data, such as the case where few observations are made within
a given spatial area.
The first step is to group data into square spatial cells. (We
will refer to components of the spectral histogram as “bins”
and the spatial grid as “cells” to prevent confusion.) Data
within each cell is summed, and the newly-observed spectrum
compared to the cell’s recorded background spectrum. Spatial
cell size choices are discussed in Section IV.
1) Spectral Comparison Ratios: The SCR method does
not detect changes in radiation levels, but instead examines
spectral shapes. SCR collects observed gamma counts into
energy bins, which may be chosen to cover certain spectral
regions of interest or can be distributed evenly across the spec-
trum. Various methods exist to choose energy bins targeted
for detection of particular isotopes [5], [9]; however, for this
demonstration, we simply chose 8 energy bins which contained
roughly equal numbers of counts in a typical background
spectrum, covering the energy range between 100 and 2500
keV, as shown in Fig. 1. Applications which are targeted
to specific isotopes or which wish to reject certain nuisance
isotopes may use bins selected for this purpose. In the course
of this research, we examined a number of bin choices,
including bins with widths proportional to the square root
of energy, as used in previous research [8]; the results of
subsequent analysis were qualitatively the same regardless of
bin choice, although quantitively the sensitivity to specific
isotope detection varied with bin choice, as expected.
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Energy (keV)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Co
un
ts
Fig. 1. An example background spectrum, with vertical dashed lines
indicating the boundaries of spectral bins. There are eight bins total.
Binning the data into n energy bins creates a vector of
counts c = [c1c2 . . . cn]. We also have a background vector,
b, containing the observed background spectrum, binned in
the same way. One energy bin is chosen as a reference bin (in
this case, bin 1). The choice of reference bin is unimportant,
as the anomaly statistic has been shown to be invariant to the
choice of bin [10]. The spectral comparison ratios can then be
computed by
si = c1 − b1
bi
ci, (1)
for i > 1. Here c1 and b1 are the numbers of counts in the
reference bin. This is mathematically equivalent to multiplying
the vector c by a spectral shape matrix S:
S =

1 − b1b2 0 . . . 0
1 0 − b1b3 . . . 0
...
1 0 0 . . . − b1bn
 (2)
s = S · c (3)
There are (n − 1) linearly independent SCRs, since one
bin is a reference bin. The SCR process compares c1 against
projections based on the ratio between bins in the background
data and the counts in bin i; the deviations of the projections
are given in the SCR vector s. Since s is computed using ratios
between bins, it is insensitive to global changes in count rate
unless they alter the spectral shape. This important feature
allows for comparisons of spectra made with unequal obser-
vation times, which happens when numerous observations over
wide areas are aggregated into spatial cells.
2) Characterizing Expected Variation: To accurately detect
anomalies, we first need to determine what variation can be
expected in the natural background. First, we assume that
counts in each energy bin follow an overdispersed Poisson
distribution. As counts are aggregated across larger spatial
cells, they become overdispersed; see Fig. 3. Consequently,
we approximate that var(ci) = V ci, where V is the average
variance-to-mean ratio of count rates (V = 1 for perfectly
3Poisson-distributed counts). V is selected empirically by cal-
culating the ratio for the area of interest. We know the
relationship between the variance of random variables:
var(aX + bY ) =
a2var(X) + b2var(Y ) + 2ab cov(X,Y ) (4)
Hence, using (1) we may estimate var(si):
var(si) = V c1 +
(
b1
bi
)2
V ci − 2b1
bi
cov(c1, ci) (5)
Here b is treated as an exact value rather than having its
variance propagated. This is a significant simplification, as (1)
is nonlinear in b and an exact variance estimate could not
be derived. Consequently, var(si) will be underestimated. The
impact of this will be explored in Section IV.
The covariance cov(c1, ci) would be best estimated from
all previous background observations made in a spatial cell,
so that cov(c1, ci) ∝ cov(b1, bi). However, spatial mapping
would be impractical if it required numerous repeated obser-
vations before detecting anomalies. The relationship between
the covariance cov(bi, bj) and the correlation corr(bi, bj) is
[11]:
cov(bi, bj) = corr(bi, bj)
√
var(bi) var(bj) (6)
To replace cov(c1, ci) we must also rescale; b may have
resulted from an observation of a different duration than c.
Consequently, we can replace the covariance with a correla-
tion:
var(si) =
V
(
c1 +
(
b1
bi
)2
ci − 2b1
bi
(
Tc
Tb
)2
corr(b1, bi)
√
b1bi
)
(7)
where Tc is the time taken to observe c and Tb the time
taken to observe b. This is obtained by replacing var(bi)
with var(biTc/Tb), and likewise for var(bj), rescaling the
observation to match the new observation time.
To compute corr(b1, bi) we do not rely only on background
observations made in the chosen spatial cell, as there is
frequently not enough data to make this possible. Instead,
corr(b1, bi) is estimated from observations in all spatial cells
by summing together observations into thirty-second intervals.
The correlation between energy bins in these summed obser-
vations is easily computed.
Finally, we can construct the covariance matrix Σ between
energy bins in the SCR vector:
Σij = corr(si, sj)
√
var(si)var(sj) (8)
where corr(si, sj) is estimated by summing all observations
across all spatial cells in the same way as for corr(bi, b1),
then comparing each observation to the global mean spectrum
to produce s.
By using assumptions about the distribution of the data,
we have avoided requiring direct calculation of Σij from the
data, as required by past SCR implementations, which would
be impossible when there are too few background observa-
tions. To produce well-conditioned and invertible covariance
matrices, many more observations than variables are required.
This would require numerous repeated mapping passes before
any anomalies can be detected, making the system impractical.
Approaches based on shrinkage estimators are possible [12],
but cannot work if there are only one or two observations.
The correlation matrices may be computed and reused for
anomaly detection in all spatial cells; in very large regions
where spectra vary greatly, the correlation matrices may be
estimated separately for smaller areas within the monitored
region. Any similar method using covariance matrices would
require each spatial cell to contain observations of equal
length, or require new covariance matrices to be computed
for each spatial cell.
3) Anomaly Detection: Previous work has developed a sim-
ple anomaly detection algorithm which makes use of the SCR
vector s [4]. In these applications a set of many independent
background observations b are made, and s is calculated for
each observation. After computing the covariance matrix Σ for
the resulting set of SCR vectors, s is calculated for the new
observation and it is compared to the background through the
mathematical construct of the Mahalanobis distance:
D2 = sTΣ−1s (9)
The Mahalanobis distance measures the difference between
a multivariate observation and the typical mean, normalizing
by the typical variance expressed in the covariance matrix
[11]. This implies that spectral shape changes consistent with
already-observed natural background variations will cause
only small increases in D2, while changes very different from
the past data will produce large discrepancies.
If the estimated covariance matrix Σ is accurate and the
background radiation source is unchanging, the Mahalanobis
distance D2 should be χ2-distributed with (n − 1) degrees
of freedom [5]. In practice there are slight background fluc-
tuations from various natural processes, and the distribution
departs slightly from theoretical predictions [5]. (See Fig. 4.)
By setting a desired alarm threshold DA based on typical
natural spectral variations, one can search for unusually large
spectral anomalies, which may indicate source changes. To
monitor a wide area, observations can be aggregated into
spatial cells and the cumulative spectrum in each cell com-
pared to previous observations. Each cell may contain different
numbers of observations, and an individual cell may have
observations at different times and locations from day to day.
Due to (7), as Tc increases var(si) decreases. This renders
the system more and more sensitive with longer observation
times.
The method does not distinguish between equally-sized
anomalies from natural or artificial sources, though the choice
of energy bins may be made to optimize sensitivity to certain
isotopes [4]. Additional benefits of this approach include being
able to detect unexpected decreases in radioactivity as well
as the replacement of one radioactive source with another,
which may maintain a constant count rate in a given area
while altering the spectral shape.
4Fig. 2. A map of J. J. Pickle Research Campus with gamma counts per
second overlaid, averaged over one month of mapping. Areas of elevated
background include the radioactive materials storage facility at the northwest
corner (A) and a cluster of large brick buildings near central campus (B).
III. EXAMPLE DATASET
We collected a sample dataset between June 22nd and
August 10th, 2012 at the University of Texas’s J. J. Pickle
Research Campus. To survey the campus, the system was
placed in a golf cart and driven on most work days on irregular
routes. Total observation time amounted to twenty hours in
48 observation runs containing a total of more than 37,000
individual two-second observations.
The natural gamma background varies spatially and tem-
porally due to many natural factors. Our surveys revealed a
spatially varying natural background across Pickle Research
Campus. A map of average radiation levels over several weeks
is shown in Fig. 2. Background activities vary spatially by a
factor of two due to natural and artificial sources.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Poisson Distribution Assumption
Our algorithmic approach relies on the underlying Poisson
distribution of radiation data. To test the validity of this
assumption, Poisson dispersion tests were performed on the
dataset as a function of spatial scales. The Poisson dispersion
test determines whether a given set of observations could
plausibly have been drawn from the same Poisson distribution
[13]. The test computes a dispersion parameter P , defined by:
P =
1
x¯
N∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)2 (10)
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Fig. 3. Mean, minimum and maximum index of dispersion of counts in each
energy bin for all grid cells, at specified grid sizes. An index of 1 is consistent
with a Poisson distribution. As expected, smaller cells more closely match the
Poisson distribution, while larger cells have additional variance.
where x¯ is the mean of all observations xi and N the total
number of observations. This parameter is χ2-distributed with
(N −1) degrees of freedom. Using this distribution, a p value
can be computed for P , indicating the probability that the
observed distribution of values would arise from a Poisson-
distributed random variable. For example, dividing our dataset
into 125-meter grid cells, we find that on average, p = 0.33,
so we do not reject the hypothesis that the data are Poisson
distributed; this falls to p = 0.17 for 250-meter cells.
To quantify this, the index of dispersion was computed for
all grid cells at various cell sizes. The index of dispersion V
is a measure of the variance of a distribution, compared to its
mean:
V =
σ2
µ
(11)
where µ is the distribution’s mean and σ2 its variance. The
variance of a Poisson distribution equals its mean, so the index
of dispersion is expected to be one. Fig. 3 shows mean indices
of dispersion for various grid cell sizes, demonstrating that
smaller cells tend to have count rate distributions closer to
the expected Poisson distribution, as expected. To account for
this, we adjusted the dispersion parameter V in Eq. 7 to match
the mean index of dispersion for grid cells at a chosen spatial
scale.
Of course, this problem is dependent on the nature of the
area being mapped; areas with greater spectral variation on
short spatial distances will need to be mapped with smaller
spatial cells.
B. Comparing Spatial and Temporal Variation
Our dataset at the Pickle Research Campus revealed not
only spatial but temporal variation in background. To compare
the temporal variation to the spatial variation, the observation
area was divided into grid cells 250 meters on each side, and
each day’s set of observations was compared to two or more
previous days using the SCRAM algorithm. Fig. 4 shows the
distribution of D2 recorded over several dozen passes through
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the SCR anomaly statistic D2 in 250-meter grid cells
in the sample dataset, with a χ2 distribution (with 7 degrees of freedom)
overlaid. The upper histogram is the result of comparing each grid cell to the
same cell on the previous day; the lower histogram compares each cell to a
fixed reference cell, showing spatial rather than temporal variation. The lower
distribution is clearly shifted to the right.
the area during July 2012. For comparison, it also plots the
D2 values calculated by comparing each grid cell’s spectrum
to a fixed reference cell, rather than comparing it to the same
cell on a previous day.
The spatial distribution is clearly shifted to the right, indicat-
ing that there is more spatial variance than temporal variance.
This validates the assumption of the SCRAM method that it is
best to compare spectral observations to previous observations
made in the same place, rather than observations made at other
locations. In other words, the background spectra vary much
more spatially than they do temporally. This suggests that
alarm thresholds may be set lower when using the SCRAM
method to perform anomaly mapping, giving higher sensitivity
without increased false alarm rates; knowledge of the prior
background is more useful than the detector’s knowledge of
what it observed thirty seconds ago at a different location,
allowing more sensitive detection.
Further research should also investigate the impact of known
natural variations in background radiation, such as those
caused by rainfall’s interaction with radon daughter products,
which have been extensively modeled [14]. At least five inches
of rainfall occurred during our observation period, so these
effects may be present in our example dataset, accounting for
some of the temporal variance, and can be compared against
existing models.
The presence of p < 10−3 anomalies in Fig. 4 is not
unusual. The p-values are computed under the χ2 distribution,
which the data do not follow perfectly: There are, of course,
some true variations in natural background in the data, and
the distribution of counts may be more or less overdispersed
in different spatial cells. As noted in Section II-C2, estimates
of var(si) are systematically low, making some observations
appear more anomalous than they should. Also, some spectral
comparisons were made with little data – because of irregular
routes, a spatial cell may only contain a few seconds of data,
giving an extremely poor estimate of the spectrum in that
Fig. 5. A heatmap of SCR values comparing one day to the previous days,
with p values computed based on the χ2 distribution of D2. A simulated 140
mCi cesium-137 source was injected on the west side of campus, at the small
square. The detector traveled along the adjacent road, never closer than 100
meters.
cell. Regardless of these issues, the algorithm is practical for
anomaly detection, as demonstrated in the following simula-
tions.
C. Detection Performance
To demonstrate the expected performance of the SCRAM
algorithm, we performed several simulations. Simulations used
real observed spectra from a 0.844µCi cesium-137 check
source. The simulation code was calibrated by placing the
source at known distances from the scintillator detector, and
accounted for geometric attenuation of count rates, as well as
the exponential attenuation due to gamma absorption in air.
The first simulation, shown in Fig. 5, injected a simulated
140 mCi cesium-137 source on the west side of Pickle
Research Campus, 100 meters from the detector’s typical path.
The detector, driving past at roughly 10 miles per hour, easily
detected the source with D2 = 156 (a far larger anomaly than
any natural variation recorded in Fig. 4), demonstrating the
ability of a small moving detector to detect sources at distance.
Next, we performed a simulation to calculate the minimum
detectable radioactive source size at a variety of distances. We
selected the same straight stretch of road on the northwest
corner of the Pickle Research Campus and simulated the
injection of a cesium-137 source at various distances from
the road into the collected background data.
To choose our alarm threshold, we used the anomaly statis-
tics distribution data shown in Fig. 4, selecting a threshold
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Fig. 6. The minimum cesium-137 source sizes required for detection at least
80% of the time, at various distances away from the detector’s path, using
both temporal and spatial comparisons of spectra. Total observation time was
136 seconds.
which only 1% of our example dataset exceeds. This corre-
sponds to a 1% false alarm rate. For temporal comparisons
of spectra, this threshold is D2A = 83, while for purely
spatial comparisons the result is D2A = 113. We computed the
minimum source size required to achieve a statistical power
of 0.8 (that is, detection of a true positive at least 80% of the
time) for both thresholds, and the results are given in Fig. 6.
These results show that taking advantage of the exact prior
background spectrum at each location leads to approximately
20% better detection performance over the use of spectra
from a single fixed reference point. Of course, smaller sources
would be detectable with a much larger scintillator or with a
much longer observation time.
D. New and Improved?
There are many academic, prototype, and commercial sys-
tems that map radiation. The SCRAM system contains many
elements in common with previous demonstrations, includ-
ing the detector, GPS, spectral binning, spectral comparison
algorithm, and spatial database. For these components, we
are agnostic to replacements: different detectors or spectral
binning choices could be chosen for specific applications. The
novel component of the SCRAM system is estimation of the
local background and its variance from previous observations.
As has been pointed out previously, simply deploying larger
detectors does not improve detection performance, as the local
background is the limiting factor [15].
It is instructive to compare the SCRAM system against
commercial systems and federal guidelines. However, these
comparisons are difficult, given varying detector sizes and
modes of operation. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
has published testing methodologies we plan to follow as our
system evolves from a proof-of-concept [16]. These guidelines
require less than one false alarm per hour for 60-second
integrations, amounting to a 1.7% false alarm rate. We chose a
more strict limit of 1%, though this is not directly comparable;
our spectral comparisons are made per spatial cell, rather than
per 60-second integration. This limit can be chosen to meet
user requirements.
For detection performance comparison, we can look to
mapping systems with similar goals. The commercial ORTEC
NaI-SS consists of a 4 × 4 × 16′′ sodium iodide detector
transported by car, recording spatial and spectral data every
second [17]. For ORTEC’s chosen false alarm rate, the detector
can identify a 10 µCi cesium-137 source at 3 meters while
traveling at 10 miles per hour. Similarly, the SORIS coded
aperture imager uses four large van-mounted sodium iodide
plate scintillators, and can detect 1 mCi cesium-137 sources
at a distance of 100 meters [3]. The detector in the SCRAM
system is hundreds of times smaller; a simple scaling of
our performance by collection area ignores many factors, but
nevertheless, the SCRAM concept shows its relevance and
promise by displaying significant gains over these previous
detection limits when scaled to their detector sizes. Given all
the differences in the systems, direct quantitative comparisons
are not currently in order.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we report on the development of an integrated
system for wide-area radiation surveillance. A mobile detector
is used to collect multiple-pass data, which is stored into
a spatial-temporal spectral database. We developed a novel
approach for anomaly detection of the spectral content by
comparing observations to previous determinations of the
background. Because the spatial variance is much larger than
the temporal variance, this multi-pass methodology has the
potential to deliver increased sensitivity to weak or distant
sources, as demonstrated by simulations.
These developments are the first steps necessary to im-
plement the larger vision of a providing continuous wide-
area surveillance through the use of mobile sensors. Future
improvements to the algorithm include the use of spatial
kriging to improve estimates of background spectral shape,
methods to determine optimal energy bin sizes, and adaptation
for use in small, low-power mobile detectors.
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